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Abstract
Recent theories of the multinational corporation introduce the property
rights model of the firm and examine whether to integrate our outsource
firm activities locally or to a foreign country. This paper focus instead
on the internal organization of the multinational corporation by examining
the power allocation between headquarters and subsidiaries. We provide
a framework to analyse the interaction between the decision to serve the
local market by exporting or FDI, market acces and the optimal mode
of organization of the multinational corporation. We find that subsidiary
managers are given most autonomy in their decision how to run the firm
at intermediate levels of local competition. We then provide comparative
statics for changes in fixed FDI entry costs and trade costs, information
technology, the number of local competitors, and in the size of the local
market.
JEL classification: D23; F1; F2
Keywords: foreign direct investment, power allocation in the firm, inter-
national trade and the organization of production
1. Introduction
Recent theories of the multinational corporation open up the black box of the
firm by incorporating theories of the firm in models of the multinational corpora-
tion. Antras (2003) and Antras and Helpman (2004) introduce the property rights
model of the firm (Grossman and Hart (1986), Hart and Moore (1990)) into a
model of the multinational corporation. They examine questions of the bound-
aries of the multinational firm by analysing the decision whether to integrate or
outsource firm activities locally or to a foreign country. This paper focus instead
on the internal organization of the multinational corporation. We introduce a
variant of the Aghion and Tirole (AT) (1997) model of the firm into a monopolis-
tic competition model of the multinational corporation. We provide a framework
to analyse the interaction between delegating power to the manager in the foreign
subsidiary, market access, and the decision whether to enter a foreign market via
exporting or foreign direct investment (FDI).1
In previous papers we model how international trade is affecting the internal
organization of national firms. In Marin and Verdier (2007a, 2006) we introduce
a variant of the Aghion and Tirole model into a Krugman (1980) cum Melitz and
Ottaviano (2006) model of international trade to examine how international trade
is affecting internal hierarchies of firms in similar countries (North-Nort trade). In
Marin and Verdier (2003) we incorporate AT in a Helpman and Krugman (1985)
model of trade to analyse how international trade between countries which differ
in factor endownments (North-South trade) is affecting the allocation of power
inside firms. In Marin and Verdier (2007b) we are reversing the question and
we are asking how corporate organization is affecting firm performance and the
nature of competition in international markets.
The paper is organised in the following sections. In section 2 we consider the
allocation of decision power inside a multinational firm between its headquarter
and the local management of its subsidiary. We determine the multinational firm’s
1McLaren (2000) is a first attempt to analyse the question of integration and outsourcing in
an international trade framework. Antras, Garicano, Rossi-Hansberg (2006) and Grossman and
Rossi-Hansberg (2006) focus also on the internal organization of the multinational corporation
by examining the formation of international teams. Puga and Trefler (2005) use also the Aghion
and Tirole model to investigate whether to involve a local agent in incremental innovation in
the South.
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optimal mode of organization in response to exogenous changes in the market
environment in which the multinational subsidiary eventually operates. Section 3
embedds this theory of allocation of authority within multinationals into a simple
monopolistic industrial equilibrium model in which domestic firms can serve a
foreign market through exports or foreign direct investment. We characterize the
equilibrium number of multinationals’ subsidiaries serving that market and their
equiilbrium hierarchical structure. Section 4 then examines how changes in trade
costs, fixed costs of FDI and information technologies affect the equilibrium mode
of organization of FDI. In section 5 we discuss the implications of local competition
and market size effects in the short run with no entry and in the long run with
free entry by local firms. In section 6 we finally conclude.
2. Power Dynamics in the Multinational Firm
We first start with a simple partial equilibrium model of the choice of firm orga-
nization for a multinational serving a foreign market through a subsidiary. This
building block will be useful later when we analyze the interaction between the
power dynamics of FDI and the market structure in an industry equilibriummodel
of monopolistic competition.
We consider the situation of a multinational firm contemplating to undertake
some foreign direct investment to serve a local market. Production within a
subsidiary means running a production project in the host economy. Following
Aghion and Tirole (1997), we consider that the multinational has the simplest
hierarchical structure consisting of a headquarter (the principal P) located in the
country of residence of the multinational, a local manager (the agent A) hired to
implement locally the production project in the subsidiary and local labor to run
the production plan. There arem potential and a priori identical projects (or ways
to produce the good). Payoffs are ex ante unknown to both parties, headquarters
and local management. Among the m projects, there are only two viable projects.
Both leads to positive recurrent profits B for the firm. One of them though gives
to the local manager the possibility to divert part of the income for himself. More
precisely, when the first project is implemented, the firm’s benefit is the entire
profit B. On the other hand when the second project is implemented the agent
may divert a fraction λB of the benefits. The firm therefore gets only B(1 − λ)
with 0 < λ < 1. Out of the diverted part λB though, the agent can only receive
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an amount λβB with 0 < β < 1. Hence part of the transferred profit flows are
assumed to be dissipated during the diversion process, implying an inefficiency
cost of implementing this second type of project.
The values of B,λ and β are supposed to be known ex ante though the par-
ties do not know ex ante which project yields such payoff. We assume also that,
among the m projects, there are some with very high negative payoffs to both
parties, implying that choosing randomly a project without being informed is not
profitable to both agents who instead prefer to do nothing (project 0). This as-
pect, together with the fact that each uninformed party prefers to rubber-stamp
the other informed’s party suggestion to do nothing, implies that private informa-
tion about payoffs gives decision control to the informed party. In this case, the
informed party has ”real authority” rather than ”formal authority”.2
Parties may acquire information on the payoff structure in the following way.
By paying an investment cost f, the headquarter of the multinational has access
to a centralized information gathering technology which allows him to learn with
a given probability E the payoff structure of all projects. It remains uniformed
otherwise. Similarly, by dedicating some time effort inside the subsidiary, local
management can acquire information on the payoff structure of all projects. More
precisely, out of 1 unit of skilled labor time, the manager may dedicate a fraction
h ∈ [0, 1] of his time to work for the firm and the rest 1− h to work outside at a
wage rate q. In that case, he learns with probability
e(h) = eh, with 0 < e < 1. (2.1)
the structure of projects and remains uninformed with probability 1− e(h).
In order to fully focus on the role of allocation of power and delegation in
multinational activities, we assume that it is not possible to contract on profit
levels B nor on the amount of effort h the manager devotes to produce useful in-
formation to the firm. Moreover, both the firm and the agent are risk neutral with
respect to income. Given our incomplete contractability assumptions, the multi-
national cannot therefore incentivize the local manager with monetary rewards.
After observing his opportunity cost to work elsewhere, the agent’s incentives to
gather information on projects will fully have to come from the power he gets
2As emphasized by Aghion and Tirole 1997, the amount of information acquisition is at the
heart of the distinction between ”formal” and ”real” decision power within firms.
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on projects’ decisions and therefore on his capacity to choose and implement his
”best” project inside the multinational’s subsidiary.
Decisions are taken in the following sequence. After paying the investment
cost f , the multinational (the principal) chooses the organization between no-
delegation (P-multinational) or delegation to the subsidiary manager (A-multinational).
Then the subsidiary manager (the agent) is hired at a wage eq.Then both head-
quarters and the subsidiary manager collect information about projects’ payoffs.
The party who does not have decision power suggests a project (or nothing) to the
other party. Finally, the party with power rubber stamps the other party’s sugges-
tion or selects an alternative project, or decides to do nothing. Hence, the party
with formal authority, whenever informed, picks her preferred project. When she
remains uninformed ex post, that party rubber-stamps the suggestion of the other
party who, whenever informed, has real authority over the project choice and gets
his preferred project implemented. When neither party has information on the
payoff structure, no project is undertaken by the firm.
Consider first the equilibrium informational effort of the two parties under the
two types of organization.
2.1. A P-multinational Firm
We start with the case in which the multinational’s headquarters keeps formal
power (a P-multinational firm). The principal’s and the agent’s expected payoffs
are then
ΠP = EB + (1−E)e(h)B(1− λ)− eq − f
uP = (1−E)e(h)βλB + q(1− h) + eq
With probability E, the multinational top management (the principal) be-
comes fully informed about her payoffs and picks her preferred project with pay-
off B. With probability 1 − E, the multinational headquarter remains unin-
formed about payoffs. The subsidiary manager decides how to allocate her time h
(whether to work for the firm or to shirk and work for himself). She learns with
probability e(h) the payoff structure. In that case, she suggests to the uninformed
headquarters her best project (which is accepted). Owners/headquarters receive
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then the payoff B(1 − λ) while the subsidiary manager gets her diverted benefit
βλB.
The first order conditions for the subsidiary manager are
h∗P = 1 and e = e if q < βλeB(1−E)
h∗P = 0 and e = 0 if q > βλeB(1− E)
h∗P ∈ [0, 1] and e ∈ [0, e] if q = βλeB(1−E)
The conditions highlight the trade off between the headquarter’s control and
the subsidiary manager’s initiative. The better the headquarter’s infomation tech-
nology (larger E), the lower the incentive for the subsidiary manager to spend
efforts to gather information on implementable projects. Control thus comes with
the cost of loosing the agent’s initiative. In turn, the larger the profits βλB the
subsidiary manager can divert from a project and the lower her time opportunity
costs q, the larger the effort of the local manager to gather information for the
firm.
Given that the agent’s reservation income is his opportunity cost of labor q,eq should be fixed such that uA = q. The firm’s equilibrium payoff under a P
organization is then given by:
Π∗P = EB + (1−E)e(h∗P )B(1− λ) + (1−E)e(h∗P )βλB − qh∗P − f
or more explicitely, posing K = 1− λ(1− β) and
BP (E) =
1
βλe(1−E)
:
Π∗P = EB + (1−E)eBK − q − f if BP (E) < B/q (2.2)
= EB − f if BP (E) > B/q
= EB + [(1−E)BeK − q]h∗P − f with h∗P ∈ [0, 1] if BP (E) = B/q
6
2.2. An A-multinational Firm
Consider now the case where the multinational has delegated decision control to
the subsidiary manager and thus the agent has formal authority. Now, headquar-
ters are prevented from overruling the agent’s decision when both have acquired
information. The two parties’ expected payoffs are then
ΠA = e(h)B(1− λ) + (1− e(h))EB − f − eq
uA = e(h)βλB + q(1− h) + eq
Now the agent chooses his preferred project when informed. When the princi-
pal is informed and the agent is uninformed, the principal suggests her preferred
project, which is then implemented by the agent.
The analysis is similar to the one of the P-multinational. We get the following
characterization of the equilibrium effort level of the local manager:
h∗A = 1 and e = e if q < βλeB
h∗A = 0 and e = 0 if q > βλeB
h∗A ∈ [0, 1] and e ∈ [0, e] if q = βλeB
Again, given that the agent’s reservation income is his opportunity cost of
labor q, eq should be fixed such that vA = q and the firm’s equilibrium payoff
under a A organization is immediatly given by:
Π∗A = EB + (K −E)eB − q − f if BA < B/q (2.3)
= EB − f if BA > B/q
= EB + [(K − E)Be− q]h∗A − f with h∗A ∈ [0, 1] if BA = B/q
with
BA =
1
βλe
defining the profit threshold below which the local manager does not put any
effort in the firm.
As 1βλ <
1
βλ(1−E) , then BA < BP (E) and h
∗
A ≥ h∗p. The agent A’s initiative is
triggered at a lower profit level B/q under the A-organization than under the P-
organization. The reason is that under the A-firm the agent has formal authority
and therefore has better effort incentives than when the principal has formal
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authority. Hence, it requires a smaller stake to motivate the agent to undertake
initiative under the A-firm than under the P-firm. Consequently, the threshold
level of profits of the principal at which the agent’s effort is stimulated is lower
under the A-firm as compared to the P-firm.
Note finally that the multinational’s payoff is the same under the two orga-
nizations when the agent does not provide any effort level (ie. when h = 0).
In that case the multinational’s organization is equivalent to a subsidiary with a
dummy local manager. Hence, we define this as a multinational O-organization
(or O-multinational).
2.3. Optimal Multinational Organization
The derivation of the optimal organizational form of the firm can be obtained
by comparing (2.2 ) to (2.3) at different profit levels of the multinational. Three
cases can then be distinguished.
Case 1: B/q ≤ BA (low profits)
The utility levels of headquarters (the principal) under the two forms of orga-
nization are simply Π∗P = Π∗A = EB − f = Π∗O
Given that h∗A = h
∗
P = 0, the equilibrium organization is an O-multinational.
At this profit level there is no trade-off between headquarters’ control and the
subsidiary manager’s initiative. When B/q is low, the subsidiary manager’s stakes
to engage in the firm are so low that even when power is delegated to her (ie.in
an A-multinational), the agent has no incentive to put any effort into the firm.
Both organizations give rise to an O-multinational.
Case 2: BA < B/q ≤ BP (E) (intermediate profits)
At this profit level, the P-multinational kills the agent’s effort and h∗P = 0,
while he exerts maximal effort h∗A = 1 under the A-multinational. Thus, the
multinational’s expected payoff under the two organizations are given respectively
by:
Π∗P = Π
∗
O = EB − f and Π∗A = EB + (K −E)eB − q − f
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In such a case, Π∗O < Π∗A if and only if
B
q
>
1
(K −E)e
1
(K−E)e is the critical profit level at which headquarters are indifferent be-
tween centralization without initiative (a O-multinational) and the delegated A-
multinational with full initiative. Above the profit level B/q the principal prefers
to delegate power to the subsidiary manager at the cost of loosing control inside
the multinational corporation.
The preceding discussion can be summarized in a more compact way. Denote
B(E) =Max
∙
1
λβe
;
1
(K −E)e
¸
Then at intermediate profits the optimal firm organization switches in the follow-
ing way:. i) B/q < B(E) the O-multinational with no agent’s effort dominates
the A-multinational. ii) B/q > B(E) the A-multinational dominates.
Case 3: BP (E) < B/q (high profits)
In this case we have to compare
Π∗P = EB + (1− E)eBK − q − f to Π∗A = EB + (K −E)eB − q − f
As (1−E)eBK > (K−E)eB as K = 1−λ(1−β) < 1 and therefore Π∗P > Π∗A
headquarters prefers the P-multinational organization. At this profit level there
is again no trade-off between control and initiative. Both types of organizations P
and A stimulate fully the agent’s initiatives. As the P multinational gives control
to the heaquarter, it is preferred by the multinational.
We summarize the preceding discussion in proposition 1, stating the optimal
organization of the multinational firm as a function of the multinational ’s recur-
rent payoff B :.
Proposition 2.1. Let Emax = (1− λ)/(1− λβ)
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i) When E ≥ Emax, the delegated A-multinational is never optimal. For
B/q < BP (E) the equilibrium organization is the O-multinational organization.
For B/q > BP (E), the equilibrium organization is the P-multinational with full
initiative (ie. with h∗P = 1) If B/q = BP (E), then the optimal organization is a
P-multinational with some interior initiative h∗P ∈ [0, 1].
ii) When E ∈]1−λ,Emax[, we have the following pattern: iia) For B/q < B(E),
the equilibrium organization is the O-multinational. iib) For B/q = B(E), the
equilibrium organization is the O-multinational or a A-multinational with full
initiative h∗A = 1. iic) For B(E) < B/q < BP (E), the equilibrium organization
is the A-multinational with full initiative h∗A = 1. iid) For .BP (E) = B/q, the
equilibrium organization is the P-multinational with some interior initiative h∗P ∈
[hP , 1] . iie) For .BP (E) < B/q, the equilibrium organization is the P-multinational
with full initiative h∗P = 1.
iii) When E ≤ 1 − λ, we have the following pattern: iiia) For B/q < B(E),
the equilibrium organization is the O-multinational. iiib) For B/q = B(E), the
equilibrium organization is a A-multinational with some interior initiative h∗A ∈
[0, 1] . iiic) For B(E) < B/q < BP (E), the equilibrium organization is the A-
multinational with full initiative h∗A = 1. iiid) For .BP (E) = B/q, the equilibrium
organization is the P-multinational.with some interior initiative h∗P ∈ [hP , 1] . iiie)
For .BP (E) < B/q, the equilibrium organization is the P-multinational with full
initiative h∗P = 1.
The proposition is illustrated in Figures 1a), 1b) and 1c) plotting the shape of
the principal’s profit function as a function of B/q. The three curves ΠO (B/q) =
EB/q; ΠA (B/q) = EB/q + (K − E)eB/q − 1 and ΠE (B/q) = EB/q + (1 −
E)eKB/q − 1 are depicted.
The three cases are illustrated. The first one (ie. Figure 1a) corresponds to
BP (E) < 1/(K − E)e or equivalently E ≥ Emax . The profit function under
the O-multinational organization ΠO (B/q) crosses the profit function of the A-
multinational organization ΠA (B/q) at some point above BP (E). In that case,
the A multinational is always dominated and we have the situation depicted by
i). Note that at B/q = BP (E), there is a upward jump of the profit function
from ΠO (B/q) to ΠE (B/q). As the agent is indifferent at this point between
doing nothing or investing in the organization, the vertical part then correponds
to interior values of initiatives of the agent h∗P ∈ [hP , 1] and is described by the
segment PM in figure 1a).
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The second case is represented in Figure 1b) and corresponds to 1/λβe <
1/(K − E)e < BP (E) with B(E) = 1/(K − E)e.This happens when E ∈]1 −
λ,Emax[. In such a case ΠO (B/q) crosses ΠA (B/q) at point B(E) and we have
the situation depicted by ii). Note again that at BP (E) = B/q, there is an upward
discontinuous jump as the profit function under the P-multinational with full ini-
tiative with ΠP (B/q) is above the profit function of the A-multinational with full
initiative ΠA (B/q) . Now at BP (E) = B/q,making the agent initiative h∗P varying
from 0 to 1, one can see that the profit level under the P-multinational moves from
ΠO (BP (E)) < ΠA (BP (E)) (ie. point X) to ΠP (BP (E)) > ΠA (BP (E)) (ie. point
Y). Thus, by continuity, there is a unique value hP such that for h∗P ∈ [hP , 1] ,
EB/q + [(1−E)eKB/q − 1]h∗P > ΠA (BP (E)). Hence, a P-multinational with
any partial initiative h∗P ∈ [hP , 1] will dominate the A-multinational with full ini-
tiative and be an optimal organizational form and is described again by segment
PM in Figure 1b)
Finally the last case is depicted in Figure 1c) where 1/(K − E)e < 1/λβe <
BP (E). It corresponds to the situation E ≤ 1− λ and B(E) = 1/λβe. Now there
is also an upward jump at point B/q = B(E), as the ΠO (B/q) curve crosses
ΠA (B/q) at 1/(K − E)e < 1/λβe = B(E). Doing the same line of reasoning
as before the vertical part at that point B/q = B(E) corresponds to a optimal
A-multinational with any partial agent’s initiative h∗A ∈ [0, 1].(ie. region AM in
Figure 1c)
We can also illustrate proposition 2.1 in Figure 2 in the plane (B/q,E) of
real profits in terms of managerial labor and the technology of information of the
multinational headquarter. The curve BP shows the thresholdBP (E) below which
the agent’s initiative inside a P-multinational organization is crowded out. It is an
upward sloping curve as more information E, and therefore control by the head-
quarter, reduces the incentives of the agents to take intiative. The curve B reflects
as well the function B(E). It is consists of a vertical part BA and an upward slop-
ing part BB. The vertical part corresponds to the threshold of profits above which
the agent starts to take initiative in the delegated structure (ie. B/q == 1/λβe).
The part BB defines the threshold value of profits at which the principal is indif-
ferent between stimulating initiative inside the A-multinational and losing decision
control in the O-multinational (ie.B/q = 1/(K − E)e) . An increase in E tends
to favor control at the expense of initiatives . In order to maintain indifference
between the two organization forms, the agent’s stakes (proportional to the firm’s
profit) have to increase to restablish the balance between control and initiatives
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inside the firm. Hence the positive slope of B(E). It should be clear that the BB
curve crosses the BP at point Emax < 1. The different equilibrium organizational
forms of the multinational firm are illustrated in Figure 2.
When the information technology of the multinational headquarters is very effi-
cient (ie. E ≥ Emax), decision power is never delegated to local management inside
the firm’s subsidiary. Under centralized control, the hierarchical P-multinational
will matter only as long as the agent has enough stakes ( ie. B/q above the BP
curve) to undertake initiative inside that structure. Otherwise an O-multinational
will prevail without subsidiary management initiative.
When the firm’s headquarter does not have access to good quality information
(ie. E < Emax), then delegation can prove to be optimal, though this will imply
diversion of rents by local management. In that case, the multinational’s organi-
zation matters for incentives inside the firm at intermediate levels of profits only.
At low and high profit levels there is no trade-off between control and initiative.
At low profit levels (ie. for B/q below the Bcurve), the stakes for diversion by the
subsidiary manager are small and she cares little. Therefore, there is no agent’s
initiative in any organizational form and the O-multinational emerges naturally.
At high profit levels (ie. B/q above the BP curve), the agent’s stakes are so large
that she intervenes even under the centralized P-multinational leading to maxi-
mum effort by the agent in both types of organizations (A and P). Since P has
more control under the P-firm compared to the A-firm, the principal (the firm’s
headquarter) prefers the P-firm. At intermediate levels of profits there is a trade-
off between control and initiative. When the profit level B keeps increasing in
that intermediate range, the gain emanating from the agent initiative overcomes
the loss of control of the principal and the O-firm with no incentives for the agent
becomes dominated by the delegated A-firm (ie. in the region for B/q in between
above the B curve and the BP curve).
In the remaining paper we will limit ourselves to the case where:
Assumption A1: E ∈]1− λ,Emax = (1− λ)/(1− λβ)[
that is the case described by ii) in proposition 1. This corresponds to the case of
intermediate efficiency of the information technology of the multinational’s head-
quarter such that power delegation to the subsidiary manager (the A-multinational)
with full initiative can emerge.
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3. Industry Equilibrium
In this section we endogenize the multinational ’s profit B as well as the decision
to access a local market by FDI or by exports, for a given international market
structure of the industry. This will allow us to analyze the interaction between
the organization of multinational firms, exports, trade frictions and market com-
petition. In order to do this, we embedd our previous model of power inside
the firm of the previous section in an equilibrium framework with monopolistic
competition. We consider a particular local market characterized by L consumers
whose preferences are defined over a continuum of differentiated varieties indexed
by i ∈ [0, N ] and an homogenous good 0 chosen as the numeraire.
U = x0 +
∙Z N
0
x(i)
σ−1
σ di
¸ σ
σ−1
The numeraire good 0 is produced with constant returns to scale (one unit
of good 0 requires one unit of unskilled labor) and under perfect competitive
conditions. The unskilled labor wage w is therefore pinned down to 1. Each
variety of the differentiated good is produced under monopolistically competitive
conditions. There are two types of firms potentially operating in the sector: local
firms in number n and foreign firms in total number n∗. Foreign firms can access
the local market in two ways: exports or FDI. Local firms and (eventually)
subsidiaries of foreign multinationals can produce a given variety i with constant
marginal cost c, while foreign exports are produced outside at the constant foreign
marginal cost c∗ and are subjects to iceberg trade costs τ > 1.
We introduce then a crucial difference between the export strategy and the
FDI strategy to serve the local market. We assume that access to the market
through exports does not need relevation of new information and that production
is operated under the production plan with foreign cost c∗ and subject to the trade
friction τ
To serve however the local market through FDI, we assume that a foreign
firm needs to acquire information on how to implement local production. More
precisely, the firm has to undertake a profitable production project which is a
way to run the firm’s production with a constant marginal cost technology. We
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embed then our previous model of power inside the firm by assuming that there
are ex ante m alternative ways to produce the good. Thus, before starting to
produce the firm needs to get informed about the cost parameters of the various
local ways of producing. By paying a fixed cost f, headquarters have access to
an information technology which discovers with probability E all local production
projects payoffs. The firm may also hire a local skilled agent (subsidiary manager)
who can spend some time effort h ∈ [0, 1] to get the relevant information with
probability e(h) as described in (2.1). As before we assume that out of all the
possibilities, only two projects are worth doing from the point of view of the
two parties.These two projects implement production with the local marginal
production cost c. As before though, one of the projects gives to the local manager
the possibility to divert part of the income for himself. More precisely under that
project, if the firm’s entire recurrent benefit is B,the agent may divert a fraction
of the benefits λB, and receives actually the smaller amount λβB with 0 < β < 1.
When no information is revealed, we assume that a foreign subsidiary prefers not
to produce rather than undertake any randomized project locally.
.
3.1. Monopolistic competition and product market
Given Dixit-Stiglitz preferences, the demand of each firm i is of the form
x(i) =
L
∫N0 p(j)1−σdj
p(i)−σ (3.1)
where p(i) is the price of good i and N the total number of firms operating in the
market
For a product with marginal cost of production c(i), monopolistic profit max-
imization provides the standard mark-up relationship
p(i) =
σ
σ − 1c(i) (3.2)
and recurrent profit levels can be written as
π(i) =
L
∫n0 p(j)1−σdj
µ
σ
σ − 1
¶1−σ
[c(i)]
σ
1−σ
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Given the symmetry of the problem, the recurrent profit of a local firm and a
multinational subsidiary is simply written as
πI =
L
σ
c1−σ
(n+ nI) c1−σ + nX (c∗τ)
1−σ
while the profit from exports writes as:
πX =
L
σ
(c∗τ)1−σ
(n+ nI) c1−σ + nX (c∗τ)
1−σ
where nI is the number of operating foreign subsidiaries inside the country
and nX is the number of foreign exporters. Using the usual "freeness" of trade
index ϕ = (c/c∗τ)σ−1 which is decreasing with trade friction τ and assumed to be
less than 1 (ie c ≤ c∗), we get the following profits
πI =
L
σ
1
n+ nI + nXϕ
and πX =
L
σ
ϕ
n+ nI + nXϕ
Taking this into account we can rewrite the principal’s profit when her or
the agent’s best project is implemented, respectively, as in the firm equilibrium
framework of section 2 with the profit level of the principal B = πI .
3.2. Multinational Equilibrium and the Choice between Exports and
FDI
We are now going to characterize the nature of the equilibrium organizational
FDI structures and the choice for a foreign firm between serving the local market
through exports or through the establishment of a foreign subsidiary. Generally,
FDI will be preferred by a foreign firm if and only if
πX ≤WI − f
where WI is the optimal expected recurrent profit of a foreign subsidiary in the
local market and f is the set-up cost of that subsidiary. Depending on the optimal
allocation of power inside a multinational firm, different equilibrium regimes are
possible. To analyze them we introduce some notations. Denote νO(E) = E;
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νA(E) = E + (K −E)e and νP (E) = E + (1−E)eK and QO(E) = E; QP (E) =
QA(E) = E + (1−E)e, and Q(E, h) = E + (1−E)eh for h ∈ [0, 1].
i) P-multinational Equilibrium with Full Initiative
In that case,
WI = νP (E)πI − q
Noting that πX = ϕπI , the conditions for positive FDI in this regime is
L
σ
ϕ
n+ nI + nXϕ
=
L
σ
νP (E)
n+ nI + nXϕ
− q − f & 0
and
B =
L
σ
1
n+ nI + nXϕ
> qBP (E)
This can be rewritten as
L
σ
νP (E)− ϕ
n+ nI + nXϕ
− q = f and nI ≥ 0
Now if we denote by n0I the number of foreign firms choosing to access the
local market through FDI, only the fraction QP (E) will successfully implement
a production project. Therefore using the law of large numbers, we have the
relationship
nX + n0I = n
∗ and nI = n0IQP (E)
which provides the following conditions for this FDI regime
L
σ
νP (E)− ϕ
n+ n∗ϕ+ nI(1− ϕQP (E))
− q = f and nI ≥ 0 (3.3)
and
L
σ
1
n+ n∗ϕ+ nI(1− ϕQP (E))
> qBP (E) (3.4)
Rearranging (3.3) determines the equilibrium number of multinational firms
nPI =
1
1− ϕQP (E)
⎡
⎣νP (E)− ϕh
1 + fq
i L
σq
− (n+ n∗ϕ)
⎤
⎦
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Condition (3.4) is given as
1 + f/q
BP (E)
> νP (E)− ϕ (3.5)
Also the condition for positive FDI is given as
nI ≥ 0⇔ ϕ ≤ ϕP0 (
f
q
,E, n, n∗, L) =
L
σqνP (E)−
h
1 + fq
i
n
L
σq +
h
1 + fq
i
n∗
< QP (E) (3.6)
while condition (3.5) becomes
ϕ > eϕP (E, fq ) = νP (E)−
h
1 + fq
i
BP (E)
(3.7)
It is a simple matter to see that the curve ϕP0 (
f
q , E, n, n
∗, L) is decreasing in
f/q. As well, the curve eϕP (E, fq ) is linear decreasing in f/q and ϕP0 (−1, E, n, n∗, L) =eϕP (E,−1). Therefore a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of such
a regime is that there exists some ϕ and fq > 0 such that :
eϕP (E, fq ) < ϕ < ϕP0 (fq ,E, n, n∗, L)
This condition defines a non empty set of values of ϕ when the horizontal intercept
at the origin of the function ϕP0 (
f
q , E, n, n
∗, L) (ie. LσqnνP (E)−1) is larger than the
horizontal intercept at the origin of the function eϕP (E, fq ) (ie. νP (E)BP (E)− 1)
or the condition3:
n <
L
σqBP (E)
We may then summarize the preceding discussion in the following proposition:
3Given the convexity of the function ϕP0 (
f
q , E, n, n
∗, L) in f/q, it is also easy to see that when
n < LσqBP (E) − n
∗νP (E), then ϕP0 (
f
q , E, n, n
∗, L) > eϕP (E, fq ) for all fq .
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Proposition 3.1. i) When n < LσqBP (E) , there exists a P-multinational equilib-
rium with full initiative if and only if
eϕP (E, fq ) < ϕ < ϕP0 (fq ,E, n, n∗, L)
and the equilibrium number of subsidiaries is given by
nPI =
1
1− ϕQP (E)
⎡
⎣νP (E)− ϕh
1 + fq
i L
σq
− (n+ n∗ϕ)
⎤
⎦ > 0 (3.8)
ii) When n > LσqBP (E) , there does not exist a P-multinational equilibrium with
full initiative.
ii) P-multinational Equilibrium with Partial Initiative h∗P ∈ [hP , 1[.
In this regime, we have :
L
σ
1
n+ n∗ϕ+ nI(1− ϕQP (E,h))
= qBP (E) (3.9)
Denoting νP (E, h) = E + (1 − E)ehK for h ∈ [0, 1] , the arbitrage condition
between exports and FDI is given by
L
σ
ϕ
n+ n∗ϕ+ nI(1− ϕQP (E,h))
=
L
σ
νP (E, h)
n+ n∗ϕ+ nI(1− ϕQP (E,h))
− qh− f (3.10)
The P-multinational firm with interior initiative dominates the A-multinational
firm with full initiative. This translates into the following condition:
L
σ
νP (E, h)
n+ n∗ϕ+ nI(1− ϕQP (E,h))
− qh ≥ L
σ
νA(E)
n+ n∗ϕ+ nI(1− ϕQP (E,h))
− q (3.11)
The first two conditions (3.9) and (3.10) give the equilibrium value of hP :
BP (E) [νP (E, hP )− ϕ]− hP =
f
q
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It is shown in the appendix that a necessary and sufficient condition for the
existence of such a regime with positive FDI is that
n <
1
BP (E)
L
σq
and that : eϕm(E, fq ) < ϕ < Min
∙eϕ0m(E); eϕP (E, fq )
¸
where
eϕm(E, fq ) = νA(E)−
∙
1 +
f
q
¸
1
BP (E)
and eϕ0m(E) = 1BP (E) Lσq − nn∗
Moreover the equilibrium number of multinationals in that regime is then
simply given by :
nmI =
1
1− ϕQP (E,hP )
∙
1
BP (E)
L
σq
− (n+ n∗ϕ)
¸
We get then the following proposition:
Proposition 3.2. i) When n < LσqBP (E) , there exists a FDI regime with P-
multinational firms with partial initiative hP < 1 if and only if
eϕm(E, fq ) < ϕ < Min
∙eϕ0m(E); eϕP (E, fq )
¸
and the equilibrium number of subsidiaries is given by:
nmI =
1
1− ϕQP (E,hP )
∙
1
BP (E)
L
σq
− (n+ n∗ϕ)
¸
> 0 (3.12)
ii) When n > LσqBP (E) , there does not exist a P-multinational equilibirum with
partial initiative.
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iii) A-multinational Equilibrium with Full Initiative
The conditions for such a regime are
nI =
1
1− ϕQA(E)
⎡
⎣νA(E)− ϕh
1 + fq
i L
σq
− (n+ n∗ϕ)
⎤
⎦ > 0
and
qB(E) <
L
σ
1
n+ n∗ϕ+ nI(1− ϕQA(E))
< qBP (E)
which can be rearranged to
ϕ < eϕm(E, fq ) = νA(E)−
∙
1 +
f
q
¸
1
BP (E)
and
ϕ > eϕA(E, fq ) = νA(E)−
∙
1 +
f
q
¸
1
B(E)
Finally, the condition for positive FDI in such a regime is
nI ≥ 0⇔ ϕ ≤ ϕA0 (
f
q
,E, n, n∗, L) =
L
σqνA(E)−
h
1 + fq
i
n
L
σq +
h
1 + fq
i
n∗
< QA(E)
Hence, the necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of such a regime
is that for some ϕ and fq > 0
eϕA(E, fq ) < ϕ <Min
∙
ϕA0 (
f
q
, E, n, n∗, L), eϕm(E, fq )
¸
Again, this condition defines a non empty set of values of ϕ when the horizontal
intercept at the origin of the function ϕA0 (
f
q , E, n, n
∗, L) (ie. LσqnνA(E) − 1) is
larger than the horizontal intercept at the origin of the function eϕA(E, fq ) (ie.
νA(E)B(E)− 1) or the condition4:
νA(E)B(E) <
L
σqn
νA(E)
4It can be easily shown as well that the value of ϕ at which eventually ϕA0 (
f
q , E, n, n
∗, L) is
equal to eϕm(E, fq ) is also eϕ0m(E) and that the vaue ϕ at which eventually ϕA0 ( fq , E, n, n∗, L) is
equal to eϕA(E, fq ) is eϕO(E) = 1B(E) Lσq−nn∗
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which gives
n <
L
σqB(E)
Hence the proposition
Proposition 3.3. i) When n < L
σqB(E)
, there exists an A-multinational equilib-
rium with full initiative if and only if
eϕA(E, fq ) < ϕ <Min
∙
ϕA0 (
f
q
, E, n, n∗, L), eϕm(E, fq )
¸
and the equilibrium number of subsidiaries is given by:
nAI =
1
1− ϕQA(E)
⎡
⎣νA(E)− ϕh
1 + fq
i L
σq
− (n+ n∗ϕ)
⎤
⎦ > 0 (3.13)
ii) When n > L
σqB(E)
, there cannot exist an A-multinational equilibrium with
full initiative.
iv) O-multinational Equilibrium
Finally, the existence conditions for such a regime are:
nI =
1
1− ϕQO(E)
∙
νO(E)− ϕ
f
L
σ
− (n+ n∗ϕ)
¸
> 0 (3.14)
with
L
σ
1
n+ n∗ϕ+ nI(1− ϕQO(E))
< qB(E) (3.15)
Substituting and rearranging (3.14) gives then the following conditions on the
”freeness” of trade: for positive FDI
ϕ ≤ ϕO0 (f,E, n, n∗, L) =
L
σ νO(E)− fn
L
σ + fn
∗
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while condition (3.15) can be rewritten as:
ϕ < νO(E)−
f
q
1
B(E)
= νA(E)−
∙
1 +
f
q
¸
1
B(E)
= eϕA(E, fq )
Thus the necessary and sufficient condition for this regime are 5
ϕ < Min
∙eϕA(E, fq ), ϕO0 (f, E, n, n∗, L)
¸
Proposition 3.4. There exists an O-multinational equilibrium with no delega-
tion if and only if
ϕ < Min
∙eϕA(E, fq ), ϕO0 (f, E, n, n∗, L)
¸
and the equilibrium number of subsidiaries is given by
nOI =
1
1− ϕQO(E)
∙
νO(E)− ϕ
f
L
σ
− (n+ n∗ϕ)
¸
(3.16)
The series of propositions (3.1),(3.2), (3.3) and (3.4) are illustrated in Figures
(3a), (3b), and (3c) and (3d) where the different regions have been drawn in
the plane (ϕ, f/q) of trade freeness ϕ and real fixed costs f/q. They reflect the
importance of the relationship between local competition, local market size and
the different possible regimes as a function of trade costs and fixed cost of FDI.
We consider four cases : little local competition ( ie. n < LσqBP (E) − n
∗νP (E))
6,intermediate local competition LσqBP (E) −n
∗νP (E) < n < LσqBP (E) that allows for
the existence of P-multinationals, intense competition LσqBP (E) < n <
L
σqB(E)
, to
finally the case with very intense competition L
σqB(E)
< n.
5The value of ϕ at which eventually ϕO0 (
f
q , E, n, n
∗, L) is equal to eϕA(E, fq ) is given byeϕO(E) = 1B(E) Lσq−nn∗ .
6Thus n < LσqBP (E) − n
∗νP (E) < LσqB(E) − n
∗νA(E) < LσqB(E) − n
∗νO(E). There-
fore eϕA(E, fq ) < ϕO0 (f,E, n, n∗, L), eϕm(E, fq ) < ϕA0 (fq , E, n, n∗, L) and eϕP (E, fq ) <
ϕP0 (
f
q , E, n, n
∗, L) and eϕ0m(E) > ϕP0 (fq , E, n, n∗, L) for all f/q
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In the first case, all the different regimes are possible and the profitability con-
straint of access to the local market through FDI is never binding for the A and the
O regimes (ie. the constraint that nI > 0 is only separating the P-multinational
firm and exports as a strategy to enter the local market). In the intermediate
competition case, P-multinationals are possible but the ϕP0 curve is not always
above the eϕP curve. In the intense competition case, however, P-multinationals
are not possible (and potentially the range of parameters for A-multinationals is
reduced). Finally, for very intense local competition, A-multinationals are not an
equilibrium and only the O-multinational firm is the alternative option to export-
ing to the local market.
4. Comparative Statics
Our analysis allows us to discuss the impact of changes in various parameters of the
model on the structure of delegating power inside the multinational corporation.
Consider first the effect of trade costs and fixed costs of FDI on the allocation
of power inside multinational firm. To illustrate this in the starkest way, it is
useful to concentrate on the case depicted in Figure (”a) with n < LσqBP (E) −
n∗νP (E) and redrawn in Figure 4 . For sufficiently low trade costs (large values
of ϕ) and sufficiently large fixed costs of FDI, the export strategy dominates the
establishment of a foreign subsidiary. Hence, for values of ϕ and f/q above the
curve ϕ = ϕP0 (
f
q , E, n, n
∗, L), there is no FDI in the local market.
4.1. Trade costs
Figure 4 also shows how, the internal organization of the multinational subsidiary
depends on trade frictions and the fixed costs of FDI. Typically for a given fixed
cost f/q in a zone of profitable FDI, an increase in trade frictions (ie. a reduction
in ϕ) from a point like H to a point like L leads to different degrees of delegation
of power inside the multinational firm.
More precisely, when trade costs are low, exports profits are relatively high.
In equilibrium, the FDI strategy to access the local market needs to provide as
well a relatively high profit level to be a viable alternative to exports. Now,
for high level of recurrent profits of the multinational firm, there is no trade-off
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between delegation and control inside the multinational firm. As proposition (?)
shows, in such a case, local managers are induced to take sufficient initiatives
under centralized control at the headquarter level. Hence, a foreign subsidiary
optimal mode of organization will be a P-multinational.with full initiative when
ϕ > eϕP (E, fq ). As well, a P-multinational organization with less than full but
sufficient high initiative will still be preferred in the region eϕm(E, fq ) < ϕ <eϕP (E, fq ).
With increasing trade costs (when ϕ keeps decreasing), however, equilibrium
profits from exports are further reduced, and as well the equilibrium value of
profits of the alternative FDI strategy. At such profits levels, the P-multinational
is not able to sustain enough initiative of local management of the subsidiary. It
becomes then profitable to induce this managerial initiative through delegation of
power to the subsidiary and an A-multinational firm with full initiative emerges as
the optimal mode of FDI. Delegation power occurs indeed for intermediate values
of ϕ in the region eϕA(E, fq ) < ϕ < eϕm(E, fq ).
Finally, when trade frictions become very high (ie. ϕ < eϕA(E, fq )), then equi-
librium profits from exporting and FDI are low. Local managers in foreign sub-
sidiaries cannot be induced to take any meaningful initiative even when power is
delegated to them. In such a case, again there is no tradeoff between initiative
and control. The optimal organization is the O-multinational firm with decision
power fully centralized at the multinational headquarter’s level.
4.2. Fixed costs
Alternatively, Figure 4 can be discussed in terms of comparative statics on fixed
costs of establishing a foreign subsidiary, for a given value of ϕ. An increase in
the fixed cost f/q makes the organizational mode moves from a point like G
to a point like I in Figure 5. For low levels of fixed costs, many multinational
firms enter the local market. Local competition therefore is tough and recurrent
equilibrium profits of foreign subsidiaries are low, leading to an O-multinational
equilibrium. When fixed costs keep increasing, local competition becomes less
intense leading to an increase in equilibrium profits in foreign subsidaries. As
stakes inside the multinational keep increasing, we have sucessively the different
optimal organizational modes of power as describes by proposition (?). Hence, the
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A-multinational will emerge for intermediate values of f/q and theP-multinational
will emerge for larger values of f/q.
4.3. Information
In this model, collection of information on local production conditions is central
to the FDI decision and how to organize the local subsidiary. In particular, we
can investigate the impact on FDI of a change in the efficiency of the technology
of information E of the headquaters and e of the local subsidiary management.
Again to avoid some cumbersome taxonomic discussion, let us again concentrate
on the configuration of parameters with n < LσqBP (E) − n
∗νP (E).
a) Headquarter’s information technology
Consider then the effect of a change in E on the various relevant thresholds
ϕP0 (
f
q , E, n, n
∗, L), eϕP (E, fq ), eϕm(E, fq ), and eϕA(E, fq ). It is immediate to see that
all the thresholds are increasing in E. Moreover (see the appendix)
∂
∂E
∙
ϕP0 (
f
q
, E, n, n∗, L)− eϕP (E, fq )
¸
> 0
and
∂
∂E
∙eϕP (E, fq )− eϕm(E, fq )
¸
> 0
while
∂
∂E
∙eϕm(E, fq )− eϕA(E, fq )
¸
< 0
Hence, for a given value of trade costs, regions with P-multinationals (with full
and partial initiative) as well as the region with O-multinationals expand, while
the region with A-multinationals shrinks. Intuitively, more efficient information
technologies available to multinational heaquarters make it more likely to have
FDI with a centralized structure and reduces the scope for delegation of power to
the local level.
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b) Subsidiary’s information technology
Conversely, consider now an improvement in the information technology e of
local management. We immediately have (see the appendix) that
∂
∂e
∙
ϕP0 (
f
q
, E, n, n∗, L)
¸
> 0
∂
∂e
∙
ϕP0 (
f
q
,E, n, n∗, L)− eϕP (E, fq )
¸
> 0
∂
∂e
∙eϕP (E, fq )− eϕm(E, fq )
¸
> 0
∂
∂e
∙eϕm(E, fq )− eϕA(E, fq )
¸
> 0
and
∂
∂e
∙eϕA(E, fq )
¸
< 0
Thus, the more efficient the information technology of the local manager, the
more likely is a multinational with an organization form that keeps the manager’s
initiative alife in the subsidiary (a P-multinational with full or partial initiative
and an A-multinational) and the less likely are O-multinationals.
We close this section by examining the role of information technology on the
equilibrium number of multinationals in the local market. The effect is ambiguous.
This can be seen from differentiating (3.8), (3.12), (3.13), or (3.16). On the one
hand, a better headquarter or local management information technology will
improve the expected profitability to establish a productive subsidiary in the local
market as νP (E), νA(E) and νO(E) are all increasing in E and e. On the other
hand, as more subsidiaries are successfully producing, competition on the local
market becomes more intense and this tends to reduce FDI profits and entry into
the local market.
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5. Local Competition and Market Size with fixed and free
Entry
5.1. Local Competition and Market Size
The previous characterization of the equilibriummultinational organizations shows
how local competition and market size affects the allocation of power inside multi-
nationals. More precisely, consider first for a fixed market size L how different val-
ues of n affect the possible modes of multinational organization in the local market.
We may illustrate these results in Figure 6. Two threshold levels of n are crucial
nP = LσqBP (E) and nA =
L
σqB(E)
. For little local competition, n < nP , all forms
of multinational organizations are possible depending on the values of trade and
fixed costs (as discussed in the previous section). However, when nP < n < nA,
local competition becomes tougher, reducing the potential recurrent profits of a
multinational subsidiary to a point at which local managers cannot be induced to
take initiatives under a centralized decision power structure. In such a case, only
A-multinationals and O-multinationals can emerge. When competition becomes
even tougher (ie. n > nA) then, delegation to local managers cannot induce ini-
tiative inside the subsidiary, as the stakes of the firm are too small. In that case,
local power is irrelevant to the multinational and the O-multinational is the only
feasable equilibrium.
Alternatively, we can take the number of local firms n as fixed and consider
changes in the local market size L. The two thresholds market sizes LA =
nσqB(E) and LP = nσqBP (E) become important. When the local market is
very small (ie. L < LA) only O-multinationals are possible. When the local mar-
ket becomes larger, A-multinationals with delegation of power to the subsidiary
emerge as additional equilibrium organization. Finally, in large markets L > LP ,
the centralized P-multinational with initiative may become as well viable organi-
zation.
5.2. Free Entry Long run Competition
So far we have assumed that there is no entry by domestic firms. However, in
the long run a change in market size, triggers entry or exit by domestic firms,
affecting endogenously the degree of local competition and thus the allocational
of power inside multinational firms.
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In this section we investigate this issue in more detail. For this, assume that
to enter the local market, local firms have to pay a fixed cost F
Assume further that the number of foreign firms remains fixed at n∗. Profits
by local firms are equal to
πL = πI =
L
σ
c1−σ
(n+ nI) c1−σ + nX (c∗τ)
1−σ =
L
σ
1
n+ nI + nXϕ
Hence, the free entry condition for local firms is
L
σ
1
n+ nI + nXϕ
= F
Combined with the condition of arbitrage between multinational entry and
exports, it is easy to see that in general, foreign firms will all adopt FDI or
exports , (ie. there is a corner solution in terms of the equilibrium number of
foreign firms undertaking FDI or exports). More specifically, we have that
F (νi(E)− ϕ)− qIi > f ⇒ nX = 0 and nI = n∗Qi
F (νi(E)− ϕ)− qIi < f ⇒ nI = 0 and nX = n∗
F (νi(E)− ϕ)− qIi = f ⇒ nX +
nI
Qi
= n∗
for the different possible multinational regimes with hierarchical structures
i = P , A or O.and Ii taking value 1 for i = P , A and 0 for i = O..When
FDI is an equilibrium solution, the equilibrium organizational structure of the
multinationals operating in the country depends on the value of operating profits
of the subsidiary B = F and how it compares with the thresholds qB(E) and
qBP (E).
The equilibrium number of local firms ne is given by:
ne =
L
σF
− n∗ϕ when there is no FDI
=
L
σF
− n∗Qi(E) when there is FDI with organizational mode i ∈ {P ;M,O}
From this discussion follows immediately the following proposition:
Proposition 5.1. i) Assume F < qB(E), then if F ≥ f/(νO(E)−ϕ) : all foreign
firms enter as O-multinationals, the equilibrium number of local firms is ne =
L
σF − n∗E. Otherwise all foreign firms undertake exports and ne =
L
σF − n∗ϕ.
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ii) Assume qB(E) ≤ F < qBP (E), then if F > (f + q)/(νA(E) − ϕ), all
foreign firms enter as A-multinationals, the equilibrium number of local firms is
ne = LσF − n∗(E + (1− E)e). Otherwise, all foreign firms undertake exports and
ne = LσF − n∗ϕ.
iii) Assume qBP (E) < F, then if F > (f + q)/(νP (E) − ϕ), all foreign firms
enter as P -multinationals with full initiative, and the equilibrium number of local
firms is ne = LσF −n∗(E+(1−E)e). Otherwise all foreign firms undertake exports
and ne = LσF − n∗ϕ.7
Proposition (5.1) is illustrated in Figure 6 in the space (F, f) of fixed costs of
entry of the local firms and the multinationals. Region O represents the region of
O-multinational firms. It is defined by the line f = F (νO(E)−ϕ) and F = qB(E).
Region A reflects the case of A-multinationals. It is defined by qB(E) ≤ F <
qBP (E) and f < F (νA(E) − ϕ) − q.8 Region P defined by qBP (E) < F and
f < F (νE(E)− ϕ)− q gives the P-multinational outcome. The remaining region
X describes the situation with foreign exports. Clearly such a region prevails
when the fixed cost of FDI f is relatively high compared to the fixed cost of
entry F of domestic firms. Hence, multinationals should have a substancial entry
cost advantage over local firms to allow their entry into the market. The larger
the fixed cost of entry of local firms, the smaller the degree of competition in
this market and the larger the rents that can be captured by multinationals. As
the stakes inside foreign subsidiaries increase with F , the optimal organizational
mode of power allocation inside the multinational moves from a O-multinational
(with no local managerial initiative inside the multinational subsidiary) to an
A-multinational (with delegation of power to the local subsidiary manager) to
finally a P-multinational (with centralized power at the headquarter level and full
initiative of the subsidiary manager).
7The case of P-multinationals with partial initiative occurs in this local free entry case when
F = qBP (E), which is of measure zero in our parameter space.
8Note that at F = qB(E)
F (νA(E)− ϕ)− q =
q
(K −E)e [(E + (K −E)e)− ϕ]− q
=
q
(K −E)e [E − ϕ] = F (νO(E)− ϕ)
Hence it can be observed that the line f = F (νO(E)−ϕ) crosses the line f = F (νA(E)−ϕ)− q
at F = qB(E).
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In this model, the local market size L has no effect on the optimal mode of
multinational organization when there is local free entry. Multinational organiza-
tion depends only on the technology parameters E,K, e of the multinational, and
the local cost of entry F/q in terms of local skilled labor. The reason is that an
increase in the local market size L is matched by an accompanying entry of local
firms, leaving the operating profits of foreign multinationals unchanged in the long
run. For the same reason, transport costs (as captured by ϕ) do not affect the
optimal mode of multinational organization as long as they do not induce foreign
firms to give up serving the local market through FDI.
.
6. Conclusions
In this paper we examine how market competition, trade costs and market size in-
teract with firms’ decision to serve a local market through exports or FDI and most
importanty how it affects the optimal mode of multinational organization. Market
competition changes managerial behavior and this in turn affects the allocation
of power inside the multinational corporation. With more intense competition,
the conflict of interests between different layers of management (headquarters
versus local subsidiary) may become more costly to a multinational firm. More
intense competition may reduce the stakes that local subsidiaries can get. This in
turn may reduce the motivation of local managers to engage in the multinational
firm. Under these circumstances, it is worthwile for multinational headquarters to
change the mode of organization of production of their subsidiaries and to delegate
decision power to the multinational subsidiary manager to stimulate her initiative.
However, the empowerment of the subsidiary manager opens up the possibility for
opportunism which is costly to the multinational firm. The optimal allocation of
power between headquarters and the multinational subsidiary involves a trade-off
between initiative and control. We find that for intermediate levels of local compe-
tition managers of subsidaries are given most significant autonomy in the decision
how to run the firm. After characterizing the equilibrium organizational mode of
multinational firms in a given local market, the paper investigated how changes in
fixed costs of FDI entry, trade costs, the number of local competitors and the size
of the local market affect the power allocatio in the multinational corporation.
The paper predicts that delegation of power to local subsidiary management is
most likely when these variables lead to intermediate values of local competition.
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Appendix 1: Existence conditions of a P-multinational Equilibrium
with partial initiative h∗P ∈ [hP , 1[
In this regime, as mentionned in the main text, we should have :
L
σ
1
n+ n∗ϕ+ nI(1− ϕQP (E,h))
= qBP (E) (6.1)
Denoting νP (E, h) = E + (1 − E)ehK for h ∈ [0, 1] , the arbitrage condition
between exports and FDI as a strategy to serve the local market writes as :
L
σ
ϕ
n+ n∗ϕ+ nI(1− ϕQP (E,h))
=
L
σ
νP (E, h)
n+ n∗ϕ+ nI(1− ϕQP (E,h))
− qh− f (6.2)
Also the P-multinational with interior initiative should dominate the A-multinational
with full initiative. This translates into the following condition:
L
σ
νP (E, h)
n+ n∗ϕ+ nI(1− ϕQP (E,h))
− qh ≥ L
σ
νA(E)
n+ n∗ϕ+ nI(1− ϕQP (E,h))
− q (6.3)
The first two conditions (??) and (6.2) give the necessary value of hP in that
regime as the solution of
BP (E) [νP (E, hP )− ϕ]− hP =
f
q
(6.4)
Consider then the function Θ(h) = BP (E) [νP (E, h)− ϕ]−h. Simple differen-
tiation shows that Θ(h) is increasing in h. From this, a necessary solution for a
interior solution hP < 1 to (6.4) is that Θ(1) > f/q which can be rewitten as
ϕ > νP (E)−
h
1 + fq
i
BP (E)
= eϕP (E, fq )
As well substitution of (??) and (6.2) into (6.3) gives the following necessary
condition for that regime:
f
q
> BP (E) [νA(E)− ϕ]− 1
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which can be rewritten as
ϕ > eϕm(E, fq ) = νA(E)−
∙
1 +
f
q
¸
1
BP (E)
- Reciprocally assume that
eϕm(E, fq ) < ϕ < eϕP (E, fq )
holds. Then Θ(h) = f/q has a unique interior solution h∗P ∈]0, 1[. Indeed Θ(1) >
f/q.as ϕ < eϕP (E, fq ), Also Θ(0) = BP (E) [E − ϕ] < BP (E) [νA(E)− ϕ]−1 < f/q
when ϕ > eϕm(E, fq ).
Now from (??), the equilibrium number of multinationals in this regime is
given by :
nmI =
1
1− ϕQP (E,hP )
∙
1
BP (E)
L
σq
− (n+ n∗ϕ)
¸
> 0
which is positive when 1BP (E)
L
σq − (n+ n∗ϕ) > 0 or
ϕ < eϕ0m(E) = 1BP (E) Lσq − nn∗
Hence a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of such a regime
is eϕm(E, fq ) < ϕ < Min
∙eϕ0m(E); eϕP (E, fq )
¸
Clearly eϕ0m(E) > 0 for such a condition to define a non empty set of values of
ϕ. Hence the condition
n <
1
BP (E)
L
σq
as the condition for the existence of a P-multinational with interior initiatives.
QED
Note finally that the eventual value of ϕ such that ϕ = ϕP0 (
f
q , E, n, n
∗, L) =eϕP (E, fq ) is determined by
ϕP0 (
f
q
,E, n, n∗, L) = eϕP (E, fq )
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or the value of f/q such that :
L
σqνP (E)−
h
1 + fq
i
n
L
σq +
h
1 + fq
i
n∗
= νP (E)−
h
1 + fq
i
BP (E)
which after manipulation gives:
ϕ =
1
BP (E)
L
σq − n
n∗
= eϕ0m(E)
Appendix 2: Changes in the information technology
For the information technology of a multinational headquarter, simple differ-
entiation by E gives:
∂
∂E
∙
ϕP0 (
f
q
,E, n, n∗, L)− eϕP (E, fq )
¸
=
⎡
⎣
L
σq
L
σq −
h
1 + fq
i
n∗
− 1
⎤
⎦ (1− eK) +
∙
1 +
f
q
¸
βλe
=
h
1 + fq
i
n∗
L
σq −
h
1 + fq
i
n∗
(1− eK) +
∙
1 +
f
q
¸
βλe > 0
and
∂
∂E
∙eϕP (E, fq )− eϕm(E, fq )
¸
= (1− eK)− (1− e) = e(!−K) > 0
∂
∂E
∙eϕm(E, fq )− eϕA(E, fq )
¸
=
∙
1 +
f
q
¸
[βλe− e] < 0
For the information technology of a local management, simple differentiation
by e gives:
∂
∂e
∙
ϕP0 (
f
q
,E, n, n∗, L)
¸
= (1−E)K
L
σq
L
σq −
h
1 + fq
i
n∗
> 0
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∂
∂e
∙
ϕP0 (
f
q
, E, n, n∗, L)− eϕP (E, fq )
¸
= (1−E)K
⎡
⎣
h
1 + fq
i
n∗
L
σq −
h
1 + fq
i
n∗
⎤
⎦+
∙
1 +
f
q
¸
βλ(1−E) > 0
∂
∂e
∙eϕP (E, fq )− eϕm(E, fq )
¸
= (1−E)K − (K −E) = E(1−K) > 0
∂
∂e
∙eϕm(E, fq )− eϕA(E, fq )
¸
=
∙
1 +
f
q
¸
[−βλ(1− E) + (K − E)]
=
∙
1 +
f
q
¸
[1− λ− (1− βλ)E] > 0
∂
∂e
∙eϕA(E, fq )
¸
= (K −E)−
∙
1 +
f
q
¸
(K −E) < 0
QED.
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